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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This is a petition for review of a final agency order issued 
by the Director of the Division of Health Care Financing, Utah 
Department of Health, on January 15f 1998. The Court of Appeals 
has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annot. § 78-2a-3(2)(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Whether treatment of short bowel syndrome through use of a 
growth hormone is experimental andf therefore, not covered by 
Medicaid. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The final agency order may be reversed, if Petitioner 
Markelle Frei-Peterson (hereinafter "Markelle") was substantially 
prejudiced by a determination of factf made or implied by 
respondent Division of Health Care Financing (hereinafter "DHCF") 
that is not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the whole record before the court. Utah Code Annot. § 
63-46b-16(4)(g); King v. Industrial Comm'n. 850 P.2d 1281, 1285 
(Utah App. 1993). Substantial evidence is defined as "that which 
a reasonable person "might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.'" When reviewing the substantiality of the evidence, 
the reviewing court must consider both the evidence supporting 
the agency's findings and the evidence negating these findings. 
First National Bank of Boston v. County Bd. Of Equalization. 799 
P.2d 1163f 1165 (Utah 1990). 
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The final agency order may also be overturnedf if Peterson 
was substantially prejudiced by DHCF's erroneous interpretation 
or application of the law. Utah Code Annot. § 63-46b-16(4)(d). 
The correction of error standard applies to agency decisions 
involving the interpretation or application of general law and no 
deference is extended to such agency rulings. Zissi v. Tax 
Comm'n.. 842 P.2d 848, 852-53 & n. 2 (Utah 1992); Savage Indus., 
v. Tax Comm'n.. 811 P.2d 664f 669 (Utah 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(B); 
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(r)(5); 
3. Utah Administrative Code R414-1A-200 & 300; 
4. Utah Administrative Code R414-13x-l.(5)(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is a petition for review of a final agency action by 
the Department of Health, Division of Health Care Financing, 
denying Medicaid coverage for a growth hormone to treat short 
bowel syndrome. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
Peterson applied for Medicaid coverage of a growth hormone 
for treatment of her short bowel syndrome. When coverage was 
denied, an administrative hearing was requested and held December 
8, 1997. The hearing was held pursuant to Rule R410-14 of the 
Utah Department of Health and the Utah Administrative Hearings 
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Act, Title 63f Chapter 46b, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. Record, at 111 (hereinafter "R"). On January 7, 1998, 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Margaret Clark issued a 
recommended decision, recommending that DHCF's denial of coverage 
be upheld. ALJ Clark concluded use of the growth hormone to 
treat short bowel syndrome was experimental as defined in Utah 
Administrative Code R414-1A-200 and, therefore, not covered by 
Medicaid. On January 15, 1998, DHCF Director Michael Deily 
adopted the recommended decision in its entirety. This petition 
for review followed. 
C. Disposition At The Agency 
The agency issued a final agency action denying coverage of 
a growth hormone to treat Peterson's condition. 
D. fielevcmt; Facts WJLtti CjLtfrtiQftg tp Thq Record 
Markelle Frei-Peterson is a 24-month old child who suffers 
from short bowel syndrome. R-126-9. She is dependent on total 
parenteral nutrition support (TPN), a form of intravenous 
feeding, for ninety percent of her nutritional needs. R-126-9, 
10. TPN is covered by Medicaid. R-126-12. Markelle1s treating 
physician is Dr. William Daniel Jackson, M.D. who is board-
certified in pediatrics, pediatric gastroenterology and 
nutrition. R-126-9. Dr. Jackson is employed as an assistant 
professor of pediatrics at the University of Utah School of 
Medicine. R-126-9. He is the Medical Director of Nutrition 
Support Services at Primary Children's Medical Center. R-126-10. 
Dr. Jackson wants to get Markelle off TPN so that her 
3 
gastrointestinal tract can adapt and accommodate enteral 
nutrition. R-126-11. He is also concerned about central line 
catheter infections and loss of I.V. access sites. R-126-11. 
His most serious concern is that Markelle will develop 
progressive liver dysfunction. R-126-11. Dr. Jackson testified 
that patients with short bowel syndrome who are parenterally 
nutrition dependent "have a high risk of progressing to liver 
failure and require liver transplantation." R-126-12, 24. The 
doctor mentioned another patient with a condition similar to 
Markelle's who "ended up getting a liver and small bowel 
transplant." R-126-24. Others, he noted, had gotten liver 
transplants, while others not eligible for a transplant, simply 
died. R-126-24-25. Liver transplants are covered by Medicaid. 
R-126-12. 
Dr. Jackson has recommended that Markelle's short bowel 
syndrome be treated by use of a recombinant human growth hormone, 
called "humatrope". R-126-13-14. He testified the growth 
hormone stimulates "transcription of certain regulatory genes 
that turn on growth of the lining of the intestine." R-126-15. 
The growth hormone is used, "in the lines of a pharmacologic 
agent to actually stimulate the kind of growth factors that would 
be required to try to make the small bowel develop and grow 
more." R-126-43. 
Markelle had been treated for several months with a growth 
hormone, financed by Primary Childrens Hospital, and there is 
circumstantial evidence that it has helped her, since she has 
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been able to take some nutrition orally. R-126-17-18, 44. Dr. 
Jackson recommended a further trial up to one year. R-126-19-20. 
Markelle's mother, Heidi Peterson (erroneously referred to as 
Markelle's aunt in the hearing transcript) testified that 
Markelle's nutritional intake had improved since the start of 
using a growth hormone. R-126-21. 
Medicaid covers the use of growth hormones to treat short-
statured persons but will not pay for its use to treat short 
bowel syndrome, which it considers an "off-label use." R-126-13. 
Dr. Jackson testified there is a higher indication for use of the 
growth hormone in Markelle's case, since he is seeking approval 
of a treatment that may save her life. R-126-13. He further 
testified that the use of a growth hormone over a reasonably 
short course, "if it worked would be a cost effective approach in 
terms of the huge magnitude of the cost of lifetime TPN and/or 
liver transplantation." R-126-14. When asked by the ALJ to 
address the medical necessity of the proposed treatment, Dr. 
Jackson testified: 
the goal would be to basically prevent 
premature death, reduce — or improve quality 
of life by reducing dependence on total 
parenteral nutrition, and increasing her 
chances of becoming independent of that by 
being able to eat and consume foods normally. 
Avoid the future suffering of — well, future 
and things that she's already encountered of 
central line infections, complications of 
central venous catheters to provide the total 
parenteral nutrition. Including infection 
and dislodgment and vascular thrombosis. And 
finally to prevent chronic liver disease that 
plagues so many patients that are on chronic 
TPN, with the possibility of requirement for 
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a liver transplantation. 
R-126-23. Dr. Jackson testified there is no other equally 
effective course of treatment that would be more conservative or 
substantially less costly. R-126-24. 
The use of growth hormone to treat short bowel syndrome is 
supported, Dr. Jackson testified, by a number of mainstream 
practitioners. R-126-15. His urgency in requesting approval of 
the treatment arose from his concern that without it, Markelle's 
condition would deteriorate; he also expressed his judgment that 
in terms of background, training and colleagues consulted, the 
benefits from the proposed therapy outweighed the risks and 
costs. R-126-26. Dr. Jackson described the use of growth 
hormone for treatment of short bowel syndrome as more a matter of 
medical judgment than an experimental procedure. R-126-35-36. 
Dr. Jackson testified that it was common in pediatric 
practice to use drug therapies that have not been proved or 
verified. R-126-37. He described this as "a fact of life" since 
"society has not deemed it necessary to study children in that 
regard." R-126-37. He concluded: 
So what's happened to pediatricians is they 
have to take those drugs that aren't approved 
for pediatrics and use them. And there's a 
very, very long tradition of doing that, both 
for good and for bad for children. 
R-126-38. 
The request for approval of the growth hormone was denied by 
a utilization review committee made up of physicians, nurses and 
a social worker. T-48. The rationale given for the denial was 
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that "the documentation indicated it was an experimental 
procedure." T-49. According to one witness, growth hormone is 
only allowed under the drug criteria manual for two groups, both 
of them having to do with growth failure. R-126-63. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A number of errors were committed by the ALJ in deciding 
Markelle's case. The ALJ applied the wrong burden of proof and 
failed to give appropriate weight to the opinions of the treating 
physician. The conclusion that the growth hormone cannot be 
approved for Medicaid coverage is based on a definition of 
"experimental" which is too restrictive under the circumstances. 
While a Medicaid agency has broad discretion in deciding what 
treatment it will cover, its discretion is not unlimited. The 
agency may not apply unreasonable policies in denying medical 
treatment• 
ARGUMENT 
A. Overview and Purposes of the Medicaid Program 
The Medicaid program was established by Congress in 1965 as 
Title XIX of the Social Security Act, "for purposes of providing 
federal assistance to States that choose to reimburse certain 
costs of medical treatment for needy persons." Harris v. McRaer 
448 U.S. 297, 301, 100 S.Ct. 2671, 65 L.Ed. 2d 784 (1980). 
Medicaid is a joint federal-state program designed to meet some 
of the medical needs of low-income persons. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 
(1988); Schweiker v. Hogan. 457 U.S. 569, 571 (1982). States are 
not required to participate in the Medicaid program; however, 
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once they choose to do, they must comply with the Medicaid 
statute and implementing regulations. Schweiker v. Gray 
Panthersr 453 U.S. 34, 37 (1981). A strong incentive for state 
participation is federal funding of a substantial portion of all 
Medicaid costs. In Utah, approximately seventy percent of the 
Medicaid budget is supplied by the federal participant. 
B. The Agency Erred In Denying Approval of Growth Hormone 
Treatment As Being Experimental 
Medical Necessity 
The Medicaid statute is clear that a participating state 
must provide medically necessary services. While a state 
Medicaid agency has discretion in deciding what services it may 
provide, that discretion is circumscribed by the federal statute 
which provides, in part: 
A State plan for medical assistance must ••• 
include reasonable standards ••• for 
determining eligibility for and the extent of 
medical assistance under the plan which •.• 
are consistent with the objectives of this 
[Title].... 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(1998 Supp.) The Supreme Court has 
opined that a "serious statutory question might be presented if 
a state Medicaid plan excluded necessary medical treatment from 
its coverage." Beal v. Doe. 432 U.S. 438, 444, 97 S.Ct. 2366, 
53 L.Ed.2d 464 (1977). 
Children receive additional protection against unreasonable 
denial of necessary medical treatment. In order for the Utah 
Medicaid plan to be approved by the federal government, it must 
provide certain mandatory medical services. 42 U.S.C. § 
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1396d(a)(10)(A). Included among the mandatory services are 
"early and periodic screening, diagnostic and treatment 
services" (EPSDT services) for persons under age 21. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1396d(a)(4)(B). EPSDT services include screening, visionf 
dental and hearing services as well as "[s]uch other necessary 
... treatment ... to correct or ameliorate ... conditions 
discovered by the screening services...." 42 U.S.C. § 
1396d(r)(5). 
Unproven or Experimental Medical Practices 
A state Medicaid agency may adopt reasonable standards for 
determining medical necessity which exclude coverage of 
experimental treatments. Rush v. Parham, 625 F.2d 1150, 1156 
(5th Cir. 1980). Utah has done this through its administrative 
rules at R414-1A-300 which providef in part: 
(1) Experimental or unproven medical 
practices are not covered Medicaid services. 
(2) Division staff and physician consultants 
shall establish criteria to determine 
whether a service or procedure is a covered 
Medicaid service. 
(3) Procedures or services proven to be 
medically efficacious for specific medical 
conditions may be provided as covered 
Medicaid services only for the conditions 
specified. Such procedures or services are 
not covered for any other conditions or for 
experimental trials. 
R414-1A-300. The rules define "experimental or unproven medical 
practice" and "medically efficacious" as follows: 
(a) "experimental or unproven medical 
practice means any procedure, medication 
product, or service that is: 
(i) not proven to be medically efficacious 
for a given procedure; or 
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(ii) performed for or in support of purposes 
of research, experimentation, or testing of 
new processes or products; or 
(iii) both 
(b) "medically efficacious" means a medical 
practice that: 
(i) has been determined effective and is 
widely utilized as a standard medical 
practice for specific conditions; and 
(ii) has been approved as a covered Medicaid 
service by division staff and physician 
consultants on the basis of medical 
necessity, as defined in R414-13x-l.(5)(a) 
and in accordance with R414-26-1.(2)(f)... 
R414-1A-200. "Medical necessity" has been defined as follows: 
a. A provider must furnish or prescribe 
medical services to the recipient only when, 
and to the extent that it is medically 
necessary. A service is "medically 
necessary" if it is (1) reasonably calculated 
to prevent, diagnose, or cure conditions in 
the recipient that endanger life, cause 
suffering or pain, cause physical deformity 
or malfunction, or threaten to cause a 
handicap; and (2) there is no other equally 
effective course of treatment available or 
suitable for the recipient requesting the 
service which is more conservative or 
substantially less costly. Medical services 
shall be of a quality that meets 
professionally recognized standards of health 
care, and shall be substantiated by records 
including evidence of medical necessity and 
quality. 
R414-13x-l.(5)(a).1 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
In her decision affirming the denial of growth hormone, ALJ 
Clark made the following findings of fact: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
*Rule R414-26-1.(2)(f) pertains to DHCF policy development 
process and is not pertinent to this discussion. 
10 
1. Markelle Frei-Peterson is approximately 
twenty four months old, suffers from short 
bowel syndrome, and is dependent on 
parenteral nutrition for approximately 90% of 
her nutritional needs. 
2. In the past three or four months she has 
begun to tolerate some oral feedings, but 
remains dependent on parenteral nutrition. 
3. Short bowel syndrome requires expensive 
technology and possibly a lifetime of 
parenteral nutrition. 
4. The goal of Markelle's treating physician 
is to accelerate her gastrointestinal 
adaption by administering the growth hormone 
for one year. 
5. Because she has short bowel syndrome, 
Markelle is at risk of central line catheter 
infections, eventual loss of intravenous 
access sites, and progressive liver 
dysfunction. 
6. Markelle has been receiving growth 
hormone for approximately three months. The 
hormone has been supplied by a Primary 
Children's Hospital charity. 
7. Usage of growth hormone for short bowel 
syndrome is considered an "off label" use by 
the Federal Food and Drug Administration. 
8. The data is sufficient to motivate a 
number of reputable physicians to prescribe 
growth hormone for short bowel syndrome, but 
it is still considered to be controversial. 
R-112. Based on these findings, the ALJ made one recommended 
conclusion of law: 
The use of growth hormone to treat small 
bowel syndrome is "experimental" as defined 
in: Utah Administrative Code R414-1A-200, and 
is therefore not covered by Utah Medicaid 
[see R414-1A-300(1)]. 
R-112. Petitioner does not disagree with the findings of fact 
entered in the case; however, they do not direct the conclusion 
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of law, when the correct legal standards are applied. 
C. The ALJ Applied An Incorrect Burden of Proof 
In discussing the reasons for the conclusion of law, the ALJ 
stated: 
As the expert witness for the moving party, 
the burden of proof was on Dr. Jackson to 
prove by the preponderance of the evidence 
that the growth hormone should be covered. 
Despite his convincing testimony regarding 
the medical necessity of using the drug for 
Markelle, he was not able to overcome DHCF's 
evidence that the use of growth hormone to 
treat short bowel syndrome is an off-label 
usage of the drug, and it has not yet been 
proven to be effective for that usage. 
Although treatment of short bowel syndrome 
with growth hormone might be more highly 
indicated than its usage for children of 
short stature, the law prohibits the use of 
experimental treatments, and Dr. Jackson's 
testimony clearly indicated that the use of 
growth hormone to treat short bowel syndrome 
was not "widely utilized as a standard 
medical practice," and therefore meets the 
criteria for an "experimental procedure." 
R-113-14. 
The ALJ's conclusion of law is based on the erroneous 
assumption that Dr. Jackson had the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the recommended treatment was 
not experimental. While it is harmless error to say that a 
witness, rather than the petitioner, had the burden of proof, it 
is not harmless error to apply the wrong burden of proof. 
Administrative agency action based on factual findings must be 
overturned if they are not supported by "substantial evidence." 
King v. Industrial Comm'n. 850 P.2d at 1285. Substantial evidence 
has been described as more than a mere "scintilla" of evidence 
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and something less than the weight of the evidence. Johnson v. 
Board of Review. 842 P.2d 910, 911 (Utah App. 1992). Substantial 
evidence is such relevant evidence as reasonable minds might 
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Grace Drilling Co. 
V. Board of Review. 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989). Of 
particular significance for this case is the rule that "'Evidence 
is not substantial "if it is overwhelmed by other evidence— 
particularly certain types of evidence (e.g.f that offered by 
treating physicians) or if it really constitutes not evidence but 
mere conclusion."'" Frey v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 508f 512 (10th Cir. 
1987) as cited in, A.M.L. v. Department of Health. 863 P.2d 44f 
47 (Utah App. 1993). 
D. The ALJ's Decision Is Not Supported By Substantial Evidence 
The ALJ's conclusion ignores the fact that Dr. Jackson is 
Markelle's treating physician, thereby entitling his opinion to 
greater weight than that of other medical consultants. A.M.L. v. 
Department of Health, 863 P.2d at 48. In A.M.L., this court 
thoroughly reviewed the treating physician rule as it applies in 
Medicaid cases and opined: 
Further we note that several courts 
require state Medicaid agencies to recognize 
a presumption "in favor of the medical 
judgment of the attending physician in 
determining the medical necessity of 
treatment.' (Citations omitted). 
In accordance, if DHCF elects not to 
give deference to the testimony given by the 
treating physicianf the agency should 
vprovide a reasoned basis for declining to do 
so which is consistent with the purposes of 
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the Medicaid Act.' Worthington, slip op. at 
7; see also Frey, 816 F.2d at 513 (vIf the 
opinion of the claimant•s physician is to be 
disregarded, specific, legitimate reasons for 
this action must be set forth.') 
A.M.L. v. Department of Health. 863 P.2d at 48. Other cases 
holding that the treating physician's opinion is entitled to 
greater weight include: Montoya v. Johnston. 654 F.Supp. 511, 513 
(W.D. Tex. 1987)("The best indicator for determining the medical 
appropriateness of treatment rests with a patient's physician.") 
and Weaver v. Reaaen, 886 F.2d 194f 200 (8th Cir. 1989)("The 
Medicaid statute and regulatory scheme create a presumption in 
favor of the medical judgment of the attending physician in 
determining the medical necessity of treatment."). 
It appears from the ALJ's decision that the medical 
necessity of growth hormone treatment was proven. The decision 
refers to "convincing testimony regarding the medical necessity 
of using the drug for Markelle..." R-113. If a treatment is 
medically necessaryf then it should be approved for coverage. 
However, the ALJ then retreats from this conclusion by saying, 
"he [Dr. Jackson] was not able to overcome DHCF's evidence that 
the use of growth hormone to treat short bowel syndrome is an 
off-label usage of the drugf and it has not yet been proven to be 
effective for that usage." R-114. 
It is erroneous to conclude that a drug is not medically 
necessary, because it is off-label. In Weaver v. Reagenr 886 
F.2d 194 (8th Cir. 1989), the court considered whether the 
Missouri Medicaid agency's policy of denying coverage for using 
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the drug AZT outside the indications published by the Food and 
Drug Administration was reasonable. In finding that it was not 
reasonable, the court opined: 
Thusf the fact that FDA has not approved 
labeling of a drug for a particular use does 
not necessarily bear on those uses of the 
drug that are established within the medical 
and scientific community as medically 
appropriate. It would be improper for the 
State of Missouri to interfere with a 
physician's judgment of medical necessity by 
limiting coverage of AZT based on criteria 
that admittedly do not reflect current 
medical knowledge or practice. 
Weaver v. Reagen, 886 F.2d at 198. 
The ALJ is incorrect in saying that DHCF introduced evidence 
that the growth hormone had not been proven effective for the 
treatment of short bowel syndrome. The only evidence offered by 
DHCF was brief testimony by Dr. John Hylen, who is not an expert 
in the area. He testified briefly as to his concerns, which 
included approval of an off-label use, toxicities and expense. 
T-126-60. In light of Dr. Hylen's limited expertise and the 
vagueness of his testimony, it cannot be said that DHCF offered 
substantial evidence on this point. 
In contrast, substantial evidence of the growth hormone's 
effectiveness in limited trials was offered by petitioner. Dr. 
Jackson acknowledged that the proposed use of the growth hormone 
was off-label, as determined by DHCF; however, that 
acknowledgment does not detract from the treating physician's 
opinion that its use would be effective in treating his patient. 
He testified: 
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[T]here are a number of other physicians 
around the country, many much smarter than I 
am, including Dr. Book who's a division 
chief, who feel that in certain situations 
using growth hormone which is commonly used 
in many, many children for the indications of 
just somatic growth, it's not going to 
threaten their life, it doesn't threaten much 
of anything except for their — it threatens 
self esteem, et cetera. But growth hormone 
for short-stature patients, that is covered 
by Medicaid as an on-label use. 
In this case we're using it off that 
label but what I think is a higher indication 
which is — and obviously has to do with 
judgment and making a guess of probabilities, 
but for saving someone's life. 
R-126-13. The treating physician testified further: 
However, the relationship between the patient and 
this physician at least in terms of background, 
training, and the colleagues that I've consulted and 
worked with has been — have basically led me to 
advocate the use of this therapy. And at least in 
my judgement and tying together the benefits 
outweigh the risks and the costs. 
R-126-26. 
E. The ALJ Applied An Overly Restrictive Definition of 
"Experimental" 
The ALJ further based her conclusion that the drug was 
experimental on her assessment that "Dr. Jackson's testimony 
clearly indicated that the use of growth hormone to treat short 
bowel syndrome was not "widely utilized as a standard medical 
practice.'" A careful review of the record shows this is not a 
fair summary of Dr. Jackson's testimony. While acknowledging 
that the treatment might under some circumstances be considered 
experimental, Dr. Jackson did not consider it so in this case. 
Again, he testified: 
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[T]he strict interpretation of 
experimental in my mind would be is she on an 
experimental protocol of like one patient in 
a study. And I guess I don't consider it 
that. I consider it more of a situation of 
taking a therapy that's been — that is in 
use, that is new, that is not 100 percent 
validated and may very well have certain 
subjects, certain patients in which it works 
in and certain patients that it doesn't. ... 
I don't know whether you call it the art of 
medicine but it's the idea of taking data, 
what data is available, and a desperate 
clinical situation and adding up pluses and 
minuses and trying to come to a judgment. 
And that judgment could be deemed erroneous 
by peers or other people, but on the other 
hand there are a number of different peers 
and superiors to me who agree with trying 
this kind of therapy, so they have been my 
guide• 
The standard "widely utilized as a standard medical 
practice" does not automatically direct the conclusion that 
growth hormone treatment for short bowel syndrome is 
experimental. As the court in Miller by Miller v. Whitburnf 10 
F.3d 1315, 1320 (7th Cir. 1993) noted: 
Clearly, the best indicator that a procedure 
is experimental is its rejection by the 
professional medical community as an unproven 
treatment. The quoted passage2 suggests, 
2
 The court in Miller by Miller v. Whitburn, and many other 
cases discussing alleged experimental treatments, frequently cite 
the following quotation from Rush v. Parham: 
"The clearest articulation of the considerations that go 
into determining whether a particular service is experimental is 
found in a letter Medicare uses to explain to its clients and 
providers why a service is ineligible for reimbursement: 
"In making such a decision [whether to provide payment 
for a particular service], a basic consideration is whether the 
service has come to be generally accepted by the professional 
medical community as an effective and proven treatment for the 
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however, that different definitions of 
"experimental1 may be necessary depending 
upon the notoriety of the treatment under 
review. Indeed, certain procedures may be so 
new and, as a result, relatively unknown, 
that the medical community may not yet have 
formed an opinion as the their efficacy. We 
agree with the court in Rush that such 
procedures are not per se experimental. If 
"authoritative evidence' exists that attests 
to a procedure's safety and effectiveness, it 
is not "experimental.' 
A number of courts have followed the lead of Rush v. Parham 
and have found Medicaid agency definitions of experimental to be 
defective. In Weaver v. Reaaen, the court found the Missouri 
Medicaid agency's definition of "experimental," which limited the 
use of AZT to those cases meeting published FDA indications, to 
be overly broad. The Missouri agency defined experimental as: 
a treatment not "generally accepted by the 
professional medical community as an 
effective and proven treatment for the 
condition' or "rarely used, novel or 
relatively unknown.' 
Weaver v. Reagen. 886 F.2d at 198. Relying on the definition in 
fiUSJl, the court found Missouri's definition to be "unreasonable" 
in light of the widespread recognition by the medical community 
and the scientific literature that AZT was an effective drug. 
Similarly, in Montoya v. Johnston. 654 F.Supp. 511 (W.D. Tex. 
1987), the court, after considering affidavits from physicians 
saying liver transplants were not experimental, held that the 
condition for which it is being used. If it is, Medicare may 
make payment. On the other hand, if the service is rarely used, 
novel or relatively unknown, then autnoritative evidence must be 
obtained that it is safe and effective before Medicaid may make 
payment.'" Rush v. Parham, 625 F.2d 1150, 1156 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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treatment was medically necessary. 
The difficulty presented by a policy which denies coverage 
of a treatment because it is not "widely utilized as a medical 
practice" was taken up in McLaughlin v. Williams, 801 F.Supp. 633 
(S.D. Fla. 1992), where the court reviewed Florida's Medicaid 
policy of denying coverage for liver-bowel transplants as being 
experimental. One of the shortcomings of DHCF's definition of 
experimental in this case is that it does not demarcate how 
widely used a practice must be in order to no longer be 
experimental. The McLaughlin court focused on this same weakness 
in Florida's policy, which it summarized as follows: 
The Defendant's contention, stated simplyf is 
that as a matter of law, until a given amount 
of time has passed, and until the new 
procedure is accepted generally, the 
procedure must be deemed experimental, and 
the state need not pay. On the record before 
us, this view appears to be both too narrow 
and too imprecise, and it ignores the rapid 
rate of advancement of medical science in the 
field of transplants. 
McLaughlin vf Williams, 801 F.Supp. At 639. In addressing 
Florida's argument that a fixed period of time must pass before a 
practice is generally accepted in the medical community and, 
therefore, not experimental, the court followed the suggestion in 
Rush that such cases can be found medically necessary if 
"authoritative evidence" shows the treatment to be "safe and 
effective." McLaughlin v. Williamsr 801 F.Supp. at 639. The 
court then went on to suggest several factors which should be 
considered in determining the effectiveness of a treatment, 
including: patient mortality; frequency, success or failure of 
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the treatment; the reputations of the doctors and facilities 
performing the treatment; long term prognoses of other patients 
receiving the treatment and the extent to which medical science 
in the area has developed rapidly. McLaughlin v. Williamsf 801 
F.Supp. at 639. 
The truly authoritative evidence in this case is the 
testimony of Dr. Jackson, together with extensive medical 
literature submitted at the hearing, establishing that the use 
a growth hormone to treat short bowel syndrome is safe and 
effective. Dr. Jackson's testimony on these points can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. There is a higher indication for using 
the growth hormone to possibly save 
Markelle's life than for using the drug to 
treat persons of low stature R-126-13; 
2. It would be more cost effective, since 
the alternative is possible lifetime TPN or a 
liver transplant R-126-14; 
3. There are studies by a number of 
"mainstream" professionals that support use 
of the growth hormone R-126-15; 
4. Short term, three-week studies, have 
shown some increase in absorption and amino 
acid uptake R-126-16; 
5. Markelle's ability to take solid foods 
appeared to have improved while she was 
taking the growth hormone R-126-18; 
6. Use of the growth hormone is reasonably 
calculated to prevent premature death and 
improve quality of life by reducing 
dependence on TPN R-126-23; 
7. The growth hormone would lessen future 
suffering from catheter line infections, 
dislodgment and vascular thrombosis R-126-23; 
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8. There is no good alternative treatment 
that would be more cost effective R-126-24. 
A sampling of the medical literature submitted by Dr. Jackson 
shows further support for the conclusion that growth hormone 
treatment for short bowel syndrome is safe and effective: 
1. D. Wilmoref "Short Bowel Rehabilitation 
Program: A Unique Approach Including 
Glutamine, Growth Hormone and Special Diet"— 
12 children treated showed enhanced growth 
velocity and improved absorption... R-17; 
2. Theresa A. Byrne, Dsc, RD, CNSDf et. al., 
"A New Treatment Option for Patients with 
Short Bowel Syndrome..." guppprt Liner Feb. 
1996—"These data suggest that treatment with 
GH+GLN+Diet offers an effective alternative 
to long-term TPN for some patients with 
severe SBS." R-25; 
3. Theresa A. Byrnef et. al. "A New 
Treatment for Patients with Short-Bowel 
Syndrome..." ftnnale of Surgery/ Sept. 1995— 
"The initial balance studies indicated 
improvement in absorption of protein by 39% 
accompanied by a 33% decrease in stool output 
with the GH+GLN+DIET. In the long-term 
study, 40% of the group remained off TPN and 
an additional 40% have reduced their TPN 
requirements, with follow-up averaging a year 
and the longest being over 5 years." R-28. 
The evidence from Dr. Jackson and the medical literature is 
both authoritative and substantial. Dr. Jackson's opinions as 
Markelle's treating physician are entitled to great weight. 
Further, Dr. Jackson has the reputation of the University Medical 
Center and Primary Childrens Hospital behind him. Since this is 
an area in which the science seems to be developing rapidly, Dr. 
Jackson's opinions are especially relevant. DHCF has not offered 
evidence by a comparable expert which would overcome Dr. 
Jackson's testimony, nor has the agency given any specific, 
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legitimate reasons for not giving controlling weight to Dr. 
Jackson•s testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons discussed herein, the final agency decision, 
dated January 15, 1998, should be reversed and DHCF ordered to 
provide Medicaid coverage for the growth hormone treatment. 
DATED this J^ day of Mayf 1998. 
— ^L-^ 
Michael E. Bulson 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
m. Paul Wharton 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant were mailed this /<^ 
day of May, 1998f via first class mail, postage prepaidf to the 
following: 
Jean P. Hendrickson 
Assistant Attorney General 
P.O. Box 140835 
515 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0835 
lichael E. Bulson 
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MARKELLE FREI-PETERSON 
Petitioner 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING, 
Respondent, 
FINAL AGENCY ORDER 
Case No. 97-209-11 
IF YOU ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH THIS DECISION, YOU MAY REQUEST A 
RECONSIDERATION FROM THE DIRECTOR OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
WITHIN TWENTY (20) DAYS AFTER THIS DECISION IS SIGNED. IF YOU WOULD 
LIKE TO APPEAL THIS DECISION, YOU MAY FILE A PETITION IN THE UTAH 
COURT OF APPEALS WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS AFTER THIS DECISION IS 
SIGNED. IF YOU DECIDE TO APPEAL, YOU ARE HQX REQUIRED TO ASK FOR A 
RECONSIDERATION FIRST, BUT YOU MAY DO SO IF YOU WISH. IF YOU HAVE 
QUESTIONS, CALL (801) 538-6576. 
The enclosed Recommended Decision has been reviewed pursuant to Section 63-46b-12 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, entitled "Agency Review - Procedure," and Department 
of Health Administrative Rule R410-14, entitled "Division of Health Care Financing 
Administrative Hearing Procedures for Medicaid/UMAP Applicants, Recipients, and 
Providers." 
I hereby adopt Recommended Decision No. 97-209-11 in its entirety. 
RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Within twenty (20) days after the date that this Final Agency Order is issued, you may file a 
written request for reconsideration with the Director of the Division of Health Care Financing. 
Any request for reconsideration must state the specific grounds upon which relief is requested. 
The filing of such a request is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review. 
Judicial review may be secured by filing a petition in the Utah Court of Appeals within thirty 
(30) days of the issuance of this Final Agency Action or, if a request for reconsideration is 
IA0 
filed and denied, within thirty (30) days of the denial for reconsideration. The petition shall 
be served upon the Director of Health Care Financing and shall state the specific grounds upon 
which review is sought. Failure to file such a petition within the 30-day time limit may 
constitute a waiver of any right to appeal the Final Agency Order. 
A copy of this Final Agency Order shall be sent to Petitioner or representative at the last 
known address by certified mail, return receipt requested. 
DATED this j*L day of January 1998 
Michael Deily, 
Division of Heal 
UTAH DEPAR' 
e Financing 
ENT OF HEALTH 
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BEFORE THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCING 
STATE OF UTAH 
•• • — — 0 0 O 0 0 — — 
MARKELLE FREI-PETERSON : 
Petitioner, 
RECOMMENDED DECISION 
vs. 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH Case No. 97-209-11 
DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE : Margaret J. Clark 
FINANCING, Administrative Law Judge 
Respondent. : 
Pursuant to Rule R410-14 of the Utah Department of Health and the Utah Administrative 
Hearing Procedures Act, Title 63, Chapter 46b, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, a 
formal administrative hearing for the above captioned case was held on December 8, 1997, at 
8:00 a.m., in Room 344, Cannon Health Building, 288 North 1460 West, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84116, Margaret J. Clark, Administrative Law Judge, presiding. Daniel Jackson, M.D., 
testified on behalf of the petitioner. The petitioner's mother was present at the hearing. Steven 
Gatzemeier represented the Division of Health Care Financing ("DHCF"). John C. Hylen, 
M.D., and Duane Parke testified on behalf of DHCF. 
ISSUE 
SHOULD UTAH MEDICAID COVER GROWTH HORMONE TO TREAT SHORT 
BOWEL SYNDROME FOR MARKELLE FREI-PETERSON? 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Markelle Frei-Peterson is approximately twenty four months old, suffers from short bowel 
syndrome, and is dependent on parenteral nutrition for approximately 90% of her nutritional 
needs. 
2. In the past three or four months she has begun to tolerate some oral feedings, but remains 
dependent on parenteral nutrition. 
3. Short bowel syndrome requires expensive technology and possibly a lifetime of parenteral 
nutrition. 
4. The goal of Markelle's treating physician is to accelerate her gastrointestinal adaptation 
by administering the growth hormone for about one year. 
5. Because she has short bowel syndrome, Markelle is at risk of central line catheter 
infections, eventual loss of intravenous access sites, and progressive liver dysfunction. 
6. Markelle has been receiving growth hormone for approximately three months. The 
hormone has been supplied by a Primary Children's Hospital charity. 
7. Usage of growth hormone for short bowel syndrome is considered an "off-label" use by the 
Federal Food and Drug Administration. 
8. The data is sufficient to motivate a number of reputable physicians to prescribe growth 
hormone for short bowel syndrome, but it is still considered to be controversial. 
RRCQMMENPED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The use of growth hormone to treat small bowel syndrome is "experimental" as defined in: 
Utah Administrative Code R414-1A-200, and is therefore not covered by Utah Medicaid [see 
R414-1A-300(1)]. 
REASONS FOR PRESIDING OFFICER'S DECISION 
DHCF denied reimbursement for growth hormone for Markelle because it contended that the 
drug is experimental for usage in treating short bowel syndrome, and it has not been approved 
by the Federal Drug Administration for that purpose. 
DHCF's policy regarding experimental or unproven medical practices is contained in Utah 
Administrative Code R410A. R410A-300 states in relevant part: 
(1) Experimental or unproven medical practices are not covered Medicaid 
services. 
R410A-200 defines "experimental or unproven medical practice" as "(2)(i) not proven to be 
medically efficacious for a given procedure." "Medically efficacious" is defined in R410-1A-
200(iii)(b) as "a medical practice that has been determined effective and is widely utilized as a 
standard medical practice for specific conditions." 
W. Daniel Jackson , M.D., Markelle's treating physician testified on her behalf. Dr. 
Jackson is board certified in pediatrics and pediatric gastroenterology and nutrition. He is an 
Assistant Professor of Pediatrics at the University of Utah School of Medicine, and Medical 
Director of Nutrition Support Services at Primary Children's Hospital. 
Dr. Jackson testified that growth hormone for short bowel syndrome is being used by a 
number of reputable physicians in the United States. He testified that it was controversial, but 
it had promise. 
Dr. Jackson testified that growth hormone is commonly used in many children to treat short 
stature, and since Medicaid covers the drug for that use, it should also cover its usage for 
short bowel syndrome, which he believes has a "higher indication." 
Dr. Jackson made compelling arguments for the medical necessity of using growth hormone 
for Markelle. He testified that he thought that use of growth hormone in this case would be a 
cost effective approach when compared to the potential cost of lifetime parental nutrition or 
liver transplantation, both of which could result from small bowel syndrome. He testified 
that more conservative approaches to treat Markelle were not successful, and as her treating 
physician, he had weighted the pluses and minuses of using the growth hormone. 
Dr. Jackson testified that the impetus for trying the growth hormone was the fact that Markelle 
was showing signs of accelerated liver disease. Upon cross examination, John C. Hylen, 
M.D., and Physician Consultant for DHCF asked Dr. Jackson if he could provide 
documentation of whether or not Markelle's liver function had normalized as a result of 
receiving the growth hormone. Dr. Jackson replied that he did not know why her liver 
functions had improved, but he thought that it had normalized "independent of growth 
hormone." He testified that Markelle had improved after receiving growth hormone, but that 
improvement could also have come from the maturation process and the oral feedings Markelle 
has recently begun to tolerate. 
Dr. Jackson conceded that the use of growth hormone for short bowel syndrome is an area 
where there is active work and controversy, and, "The indications are not in your code for 
using it this way." 
As the expert witness for the moving party, the burden of proof was on Dr. Jackson to prove 
by the preponderance of the evidence that the growth hormone should be covered. Despite his 
convincing testimony regarding the medical necessity of using the drug for Markelle, he was 
not able to overcome DHCF's evidence that the use of growth hormone to treat short bowel 
syndrome is an off-label usage of the drug, and it has not yet been proven to be effective for 
that usage. Although treatment of short bowel syndrome with growth hormone might be more 
highly indicated than its usage for children of short stature, the law prohibits the use of 
experimental treatments, and Dr. Jackson's testimony clearly indicated that the use of growth 
hormone to treat short bowel syndrome was not "widely utilized as a standard medical 
practice," and therefore meets the criteria for an "experimental procedure." 
RECOMMENDED AGENCY ACTION 
I recommend that DHCFs action be UPHELD. 
Worn* TO REVIEW 
This Recommended Decision will be automatically reviewed by the Department of Health, 
Division of Health Care Financing, prior to its release. Both the Recommended Decision and 
a Final Agency Action, which represent the results of that review, will be released 
simultaneously by the Department of Health, Division of Health Care Financing. 
DATED this 7 day of January 1998 
Administrative Law Judge 
The following exhibits were admitted into evidence: 
RESPONDENT'S EXHIBIT 1: Off-Label Drug Policy 
PETITIONER'S EXHIBIT 1: Medical Literature Regarding Short Bowel Syndrome and 
Growth Hormone 
PETITIONER'S EXHIBIT 2: Billing Records for Markelle 
No: 97-209-11 
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